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POLICING CORPORATE CONDUCT TOWARD MINORITY
COMMUNITIES:
AN INSURANCE LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE OF RACE
IN CALCULATING TORT DAMAGES

Dhruti J. Patel

ABSTRACT
Courts commonly use U.S. Department of Labor actuarial tables, which
explicitly take into account the race of the tort victim, to determine average
national wage, work-life expectancy, and life expectancy. This practice has led to
wide discrepancies between average damage awards for minority plaintiffs
compared to white plaintiffs even if both plaintiffs are similarly situated. While
recent legal scholarship criticizes the use of race-based tables and addresses the
Equal Protection and incentive concerns such tables present, few courts have
deviated from the explicit use of race in determining tort damages.
Though the use of demographic features, such as race, to predict future lost
earnings is viewed as a way to calculate more accurate damage awards, a closer
look at the effects of race-based tables shows the practice does more harm than good.
Specifically, this Note considers the intersection of corporate liability insurance
and tort law and how race-based tables affect the deterrence and oversight
objectives of the relationship. The first Part of this Note provides an overview of
how insurance and tort law work together, as well as the recognized issues with the
use of race-based tables. The second Part focuses on how race-based damage
awards inhibit deterrence of corporate tortious misconduct by not allowing
insurance providers to accurately price premiums. Further, race-based damage
awards also prevent insurance providers from adequately policing corporations
and mandating certain precautions, which leads to an increased likelihood of
tortious harm. The final Part proposes that state legislatures rectify the negative
consequences race-based tables create by outlawing the use of race-based tables and
establishing a minimum damage award using blended actuarial tables.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine two fifteen-year-old boys who live in two different
apartment complexes in New York City. Both boys go to high
school, play sports after school, and have similar prospects of going
to college. The only notable difference between these two teenagers is that one is black and lives in an apartment complex that is
predominantly black, and the other is white and lives in an apartment complex that is predominantly white. Despite their similar
situations, if asbestos is found in each apartment building and a
negligence suit is brought, it is likely the black teenager would receive less in damages than the white teenager solely due to his
race. Further, it is more likely the corporate landlords of the building with a predominantly black population will have fewer safety
precautions in place to detect and remove the asbestos. This is due
to the courts’ continued reliance on race-based actuarial tables to
determine future wages and work-life expectancy. These tables,
which the U.S. Department of Labor publishes and expert witnesses rely upon, stratify statistics by race and gender to particularize
damage awards to a plaintiff’s demographic characteristics. On average, minority plaintiffs are awarded a lower damage amount than
white plaintiffs due to the discrepancies in these tables.
Legal scholars have recently addressed the issues the use of racebased actuarial tables presents. These issues include concerns
about Equal Protection, perpetuation of past wrongs, and the potential distortion of deterrence incentives. This Note builds off
these concerns by analyzing the use of race-based tables from the
perspective of insurance law. As insurance providers are the ultimate cost bearers for most tortious conduct, it is important to understand the effects race-based actuarial tables have on insurance
providers and whether these effects align with the main objectives
of insurance law. This Note argues that when looking at the use of
race-based tables in tort damages through an insurance law lens,
there is further evidence that these tables should be outlawed and
replaced with blended tables that do not stratify by race.
Part I provides an overview of the legal scholarship surrounding
the overlap of tort liability and liability insurance, as well as reform
proposals addressing the effects of race in tort law, insurance law,
and insurance mechanisms. Part II explains how the use of racebased actuarial tables affects insurance pricing and policing mechanisms and how these effects are detrimental to the policy objectives of insurance law. To address the deterrence and policing
problems presented by the use of race-based actuarial tables, Part
III calls for state legislatures to prohibit the use of race-based actu-
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arial tables in calculating tort damages and mandate the use of
blended tables.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF INSURANCE AND TORT LAW AND THE
INEQUALITIES PERPETUATED BY THE USE OF RACE-BASED ACTUARIAL
TABLES TO CALCULATE DAMAGES
Legal scholarship has recognized the intersection of liability insurance and tort law and the importance of liability insurance in
1
analyzing the deterrence effect of tort damages. This Part first
looks at the role liability insurance plays in tort law in general and
then specifically how it affects misconduct. As a result of the widespread use of liability insurance, insurers are the ultimate cost
bearers of tortious misconduct. Following an overview of how corporate liability insurance works within the framework of tort liability, this Part summarizes calls for reform and legislation that address the use of race in both insurance and tort law. Legal scholars
have examined how insurance pricing mechanisms that are based
on group characteristics, such as gender and race, result in individual unfairness, namely higher premiums for individuals within
2
those groups. Many state legislatures have passed laws preventing
the consideration of race when determining individual premiums
3
in response to fairness arguments. Similarly, legal scholars have
called for ending the use of race-based actuarial tables as a deter4
minant of tort damages.
1.
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (describing tort law and insurance as “separate bodies that form a common gravitational field”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the
Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (1990); Kenneth S. Abraham &
Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993).
2.
See Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The Next Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. 1, 7
(2014). See also Mary L. Heen, Ending Jim Crow Life Insurance Rates, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y
360, 362–63 (2009).
3.
Many states prohibit “unfair discrimination” in insurance underwriting, though this
prohibition does not explicitly or necessarily include racial discrimination in insurance underwriting. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Towards a Universal
Framework for Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (finding that
thirteen states have general statues prohibiting “unfair discrimination” in all lines of insurance, and forty-five states have statues prohibiting “unfair discrimination” in life insurance
specifically). States have varying restrictions on the use of race in determining insurance
rates in different lines of insurance. For example, twenty-three states prohibit the use of race
in determining automobile insurance rates, but only nine states completely prohibit the use
of race in setting rates for all lines of insurance. Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel
Benjamin Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195,
206–10 (2014) [hereinafter Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance].
4.
See, e.g., Anne M. Anderson, How Much Are You Worth? A Statutory Alternative to the
Unconstitutionality of Experts’ Use of Minority-Based Statistics, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 206 (2016);
Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 (2017);
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A. Insurance Law Can Hinder Tort Law Objectives if
Pricing Mechanisms Are Inaccurate
Tort law is defined by three main objectives: compensatory justice, deterrence, and corrective justice. Insurance has the potential
to both enhance and hinder these objectives depending on the
mechanisms used to calculate premiums and pass costs to insurance consumers. The insurance regime began to develop and grow
5
in the early Twentieth century. Since that time, liability insurance
has influenced the way tort law is enforced and has allowed the tort
regime to continue to compensate victims. The original purpose of
liability insurance was to protect the insured against liabilities owed
to third parties. But, insurance law soon came to recognize the
need for private compensation between two parties when cars be6
came a common mode of transportation. The fear that individuals
would not be able to adequately compensate those whom they
harmed became a public concern, and legislatures developed stat7
utory reforms to address the problem. Statutory provisions required insurers to compensate tort victims even if the tortfeasors
8
were insolvent.
Some advocates of the insurance system argue that insurance allows tort law to achieve compensatory justice, a recognized goal of
9
tort law. Gary Schwartz states that insurance law is essential to tort
law because it helps guarantee compensation to the tort victim
10
when the insured is at fault. He argues that compensatory justice
as a policy objective only makes sense if tort law aims to shift the
11
burden of the tortious conduct to a “suitable loss-bearer.” Without insurance, and assuming the defendant cannot afford to pay
tort damages, tort law merely shifts the “devastating loss” from a
tort victim to an insolvent defendant, resulting in neither compenMartha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort
Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994); Kaitlyn Filzer, Devaluing
Child Plaintiffs Due to Their Race, Gender, and Socioeconomic Status: Why Courts Have Been Calculating Lost Future Earning Damages Wrong and How They Can Get It Right, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 561
(2011).
5.
David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts: Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS. L.J. 857, 861 (2001).
6.
Id. at 863.
7.
Id. at 864.
8.
Id. at 861.
9.
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 at 17 (2000); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14 (3d ed., 2007); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 466–67 (1990); Benjamin
Shmueli, Pluralism in Tort Law Theory: Balancing Instrumental Theories and Corrective Justice, 84
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 745, 752 (2015); Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4
CURRENT LEGIS. PROBS. 137, 165–68 (1951).
10.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 359.
11.
Id.
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sation for the plaintiff nor any overall social benefit. But, at a
maximum, insurance will likely only compensate a plaintiff the
amount a court awards in damages. Therefore, true compensatory
justice can only be achieved if damages are calculated in an accurate way. If not, insurance providers will pay an amount different
than what compensatory justice would require.
While insurance aids tort law in achieving compensatory justice,
insurance can also hinder tort law by encouraging tortious conduct. One effect of the rise of insurance law is the risk of “moral
hazard.” Moral hazard results primarily from the lack of accurate
information available to insurance companies when they calculate
premiums based on an individual’s level of care and the risk of
harm resulting from the various activities in which the individual
13
engages in. Moral hazard refers to a phenomenon whereby an
insured does not act using the appropriate level of risk due to the
14
level of protection offered by insurance. Insurance causes an individual to act in a riskier manner because the individual does not
directly and completely bear the costs of the harm he or she caus15
es. Therefore, if an individual is insured, either due to a statutory
mandate or through his or her own choice, tort liability no longer
serves to deter the individual from participating in risky and harmful conduct as the individual does not pay the full cost of the tort
16
judgment. Race-based actuarial tables are a prime example of
moral hazard as they discount the cost of harm for corporate tort17
feasors depending on their victim’s race. The discount has two
potential effects: First, the discount makes it more difficult for insurance providers to accurately predict costs and pass those on to
corporations via higher premiums. Second, corporations themselves are more likely to engage in riskier behavior in communities

12.
Id.
13.
See, Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 864–66.
14.
See, e.g., Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91, 93 (1996) (“Simply put, moral hazard is the proclivity of parties that have purchased insurance to behave in a riskier fashion
than they did before.”); Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 865.
15.
Legal scholars continue to debate whether tort law, absent any liability insurance
regime, truly acts to deter tortious conduct. Scholars who hold a “law and economics” view
of tort law adhere to the argument that tort law is essential for deterrence. See, e.g., GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). In contrast, others have critiqued the efficiency of tort law in achieving its deterrence objectives. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Alternative Compensation Schemes and
Tort Theory: Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558 (1985). A more moderate argument suggests that tort law deters tortious conduct to some extent, but not to the extent the
“law and economics” view of tort law purports it does. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378–79 (1994).
16.
See Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 865. See also Schwartz, supra note 1.
17.
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 697–98 (finding that tort damage awards
for minority plaintiffs, on average, are less than awards for white plaintiffs).
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of color because the costs of doing so are lower and therefore
more appealing to insurance providers, which could reduce pre18
mium rates. Premiums that accurately reflect the cost of the harm
corporate tortfeasors will potentially cause, however, will result in
the optimal level of deterrence, as individuals would pay the full
19
amount of their tort liability over successive payments.
In addition to the warped deterrence outcomes insurance causes, insurance can also undermine another goal of tort law: corrective justice. In principle, corrective justice seems fundamentally at
odds with insurance. Corrective justice emphasizes that tortfeasors,
including corporations, should be personally responsible for the
20
harm they cause. Though a court can still find individuals liable,
corrective justice emphasizes the “duty of wrongdoers . . . to repair
21
the wrongful losses for which they are responsible.” To a large extent, personal liability no longer exists because insurance providers
usually cover costs of harmful activity as long as the behavior is not
22
purposeful. The tension between insurance and corrective justice
23
disappears, however, if insurance is accurately priced. If insurance
providers price premiums based on the actual level of risk and cost
of an individual’s behavior, the individual is the ultimate cost bear24
er of his own liability. Race-based tables, though, enforce the assumption that injury to a minority plaintiff causes less harm than
the same injury to a white plaintiff. Assuming the actual cost of
harm is the same because the injury is the same regardless of race,
the current way of pricing premiums is inaccurate because the cost
of harm calculation, which is represented by the amount of damages, is inaccurate. Also, removing factors like race from damages
calculations could reduce the amount of speculation involved in
18.
Moral hazard shows how insurance can cause insured entities to engage in riskier
behavior because insurance protects them. See Chandler, supra note 14. Race-based tables
amplify the already-existing moral hazard problem because not only are tortfeasors insured,
but they are insured for a lower cost if they primarily interact with minority communities
because they are liable for a lower amount of damages. See id.
19.
Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 865.
20.
See, e.g., id. at 866 (“At first glance, liability insurance might seem to be completely
inconsistent with the corrective justice perspective.”); Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 55, 87 (2016) (“Corrective justice theory is built
on the idea that when one person wrongfully injures another, he is required to correct this
injury by making the victim whole.”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 332 (“[C]orrective justice—
in this respect somewhat resembling retributive justice—emphasizes that the tort defendant,
having created risks in a certain way, should serve as the actual source of the compensation
payment.”).
21.
Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 610 (2006)
(quoting Jules Coleman, RISKS AND WRONGS 324 (1992)).
22.
See, e.g., id. at 606.
23.
Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 867–68. See also Lemann, supra note 20, at 90 (“Corrective justice still conceives of the duty to correct as being satisfied by ‘repairing the wrongful losses’ a tortfeasor causes, that is, paying money from one party to another.”).
24.
Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 867–68.
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insurance risk-assessment. Similar to the deterrence effects discussed above, because insurance providers face barriers that pre25
vent them from accurately assessing and pricing individual risk,
corporate insurance liability regimes prevent tort law from fully
achieving its corrective justice objective.
On the other hand, scholars have argued that insurance law’s
use of technology to more accurately predict feature and experience ratings for insured persons has made the pricing of insurance
premiums more accurate, which facilitates the goal of corrective
26
justice. Feature rating is when insurance providers adjust premi27
ums based on an insured’s risk characteristics. Experience rating
refers to when insurance providers adjust premiums based on the
28
loss the insured entity incurred during a certain period of time.
Further, in cases where a minor negligent act results in massive injuries, and therefore massive damage judgments, insurance law
may align more closely with the common perception of the duty to
29
correct. Insurance law spreads the costs of liability among many
potential tortfeasors, which allows an individual who committed a
minor infraction to correct to a less-burdensome extent. Scholars
have recognized, however, that insurance is not able to incorporate
all the extrinsic considerations that influence insurance premiums,
30
including the wealth and environment of the insured. These external considerations again highlight whether corrective justice is
fully realized under any insurance regime.
B. Corporate Liability Insurance Benefits Tort Victims by Facilitating
Compensatory Justice and Monitoring Corporate Behavior
Insurance law can counteract the disincentives limited liability
causes by allowing tort victims to fully recover from corporations
and passing on costs of liability to corporations. Limited liability

25.
Id. at 865.
26.
See Lemann, supra note 20, at 90, 96 (“As technological innovations give the insurance industry more and more powerful tools to track and assign costs to individuals’ behavior in real time, insurance is beginning to look more and more like a liability rule in the
sense that the term is used to describe tort law.”).
27.
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 206 (2012).
28.
Id.
29.
See Lemann, supra note 20, at 90, 96.
30.
Id. See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, & Stephen J. Carroll, THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE, 52–53 (2010) (arguing that while insurance can correct some moral issues with tort judgments, such as paying massive damages for a slight error, it cannot solve all moral issues, such as how poor
people are likely to pay more in insurance due because their rates of loss are higher due to
crime).

FALL 2019]

Policing Corp. Conduct Toward Minority Communities

235

for corporate shareholders reduces how effectively tort liability can
regulate corporate conduct. Limited liability distorts shareholder
incentives to act with the optimal level of care because shareholders will not bear the full cost of the corporation’s harm. The only
31
cost they face is the loss of their initial investment. Although limited liability is a component of corporate structure, and thus distinct from third party-provided liability insurance, limited liability
already presents barriers to limiting corporate tortious activity. Beyond the loss of a shareholder’s equity investment, tort liability is
“not part of any actor’s calculation,” which allows the corporation
32
to undertake socially undesirable decisions. Since individual actors within corporations do not bear the full cost of a potential tort
judgment, risky business decisions create negative externalities for
tort creditors. An individual shareholder may not support the
adoption of costly prophylactic measures, for example, because the
costs of these measures outweigh any loss the individual would
face. Further, though limited liability is not absolute, as there is
still the option of piercing the corporate veil, courts are reluctant
33
to do so in widely-held firms.
When limited liability of corporate shareholders is paired with
liability insurance, compensatory justice may be achieved. Despite
the protection of limited liability, corporate shareholders often in34
fluence corporations to purchase general liability insurance. In
addition, though corporations are considered risk-neutral, the
demand for corporate insurance is high due to the “valueenhancing” effect of purchasing insurance and creditors requiring
35
the corporation to have insurance for certain liabilities. While individuals are only able to purchase liability insurance for limited
situations, corporations are able to purchase liability insurance for
36
most types of businesses and injuries. Corporate liability insurance also serves to alleviate the inability of tort creditors to recover
tort judgments under limited liability when a corporation has insufficient assets, as the insurance policy pays the judgment in37
stead. In this sense, corporate insurance, like personal insurance
31.
See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1373 (2007). See also David W. Leebron, Limited Liability,
Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1584–85 (1991).
32.
Leebron, supra note 31, at 1584–85.
33.
Id. at 1567.
34.
Nina A. Mendelson, Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1285–88 (2002).
35.
Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5
REV. L. & ECON. 541, 543, 546 (2009).
36.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1888 (1991); Mendelson, supra note 34, at 1225.
37.
See Millon, supra note 31, at 1356 (describing how a corporation acts reasonably
when purchasing liability insurance that adequately covers foreseeable tort judgments com-

236

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

for individual tortfeasors, makes it more likely that a tort judgment
will result in compensatory justice for the victim. But, this is limited
to the extent to which insurance will cover the full amount of the
tort judgment when the corporation is unable to pay the remaining amount from its own assets.
Due to the prevalence of corporate insurance, commentators
argue that insurance providers function as corporate monitors and
regulators through insurance premiums and provisions that limit
38
insurance coverage to certain corporate conduct. Scholars have
studied the role insurance companies play in regulating corporate
director and officer behavior through director and officer liability
insurance, and many of the same considerations apply to corporate
39
tort liability insurance. As the ultimate cost-bearers for the majority of corporate misconduct, insurance providers have the financial
incentive to adopt policies that control moral hazard and reduce
40
the risk a particular insured poses. Insurance providers may also
be the most effective entity to regulate insureds due to both their
“motivation to reduce misconduct” along with the “know-how” to
41
reduce loss. The three main methods insurance providers use to
manage an insured’s risk are loss prevention policies, underwrit42
ing, and rating.
Insurance providers specialize in loss prevention policies, such
43
as monitoring services, which reduce agency costs between owners and managers, and claims management, which reduces post44
accident loss. In the context of products liability insurance, for
example, insurance companies are the most cost-efficient regula-

pared to opportunistic corporate behavior where the corporation underinsures or selfinsures with the knowledge that the corporation will be unable to pay tort judgments and
individual officers and directors are not liable under limited liability doctrine).
38.
See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 228–29; EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN,
GOING BY THE BOOK 100 (1982); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 27; Mendelson, supra note
34; John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1543–
44 (2017).
39.
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1823 (2007); id. at 1797 (arguing
that director and officer liability insurers can achieve deterrence objectives of corporate law
by pricing insurance based on risk, monitoring corporations they insure, and managing the
settlement of corporate lawsuits). See also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 27, at 218 (describing the various techniques insurance providers use to regulate their insureds, including
differentiated premiums, deductibles, copayments, refusal to insure, advising on safer conduct, research and development of safer methods, and influencing government regulation).
40.
See Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1543.
41.
Id. at 1595–96 (“[B]undling loss prevention with insurance coverage is more effective because an insurer giving loss-prevention advice has ‘skin in the game,’ and is also more
efficient because of synergies with underwriting and claims management.”).
42.
Id. at 1554–55.
43.
Goldberg, supra note 35, at 543.
44.
See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J.
BUS. 281, 285 (1982).
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tors of corporate behavior due to the specific research insurance
45
providers conduct when determining premiums. Products liability, which can result in mass tort litigation, is insured at a company46
specific level. Insurance companies collect information regarding
the manufacturing, design, and inspection of the product and use
this information to price premiums and to train employees on re47
ducing liability. Insurance providers also act as regulators when
48
assessing environmental risk of a firm. Insurance liability premi49
ums act as an ex-ante Pigouvian tax, which compels corporations
to internalize liability costs that limited liability partially externaliz50
es. As discussed earlier, however, the power of corporate insurance providers to regulate firm behavior depends on the accuracy
51
of the insurance premium.
Underwriting and experience and feature rating also control
moral hazard by incentivizing corporations to engage in less risky
52
behavior. Underwriting consists of insurance providers using information about the insured to determine risk, set premium rates,
53
and form conditions for insurance coverage. The insurance rate
and contractual conditions incentivize corporations to take more
54
precautions and reduce the probability of liability. For example,
an insurer can condition coverage on whether a corporation
adopts loss-prevention measures, which incentivizes corporations
55
to implement policies that reduce risk. Through the rating system, an insurer can differentiate the risk the insured presents
based on certain features, such as the industry the corporation operates in, or the loss history of the insured; the insurer can then
56
charge a higher premium to riskier corporations. Risk differentiation influences corporations to reduce their risk profiles to obtain
57
a lower premium.

45.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 27, at 218.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 225–26.
49.
A Pigouvian tax is a tax levied upon a corporation that is equal to the costs of the
harm the corporation externalizes. It is a governmental mechanism to force corporations to
internalize external costs. See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
(1920).
50.
Id. at 232.
51.
Id. at 233 (“Since most regulated parties do not have the information necessary to
accurately convert expected ex post liability awards and fines into an exactly equivalent
Pigouvian tax, and since the government does not provide such estimates to help people
plan, insurers fill this void.”).
52.
Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1554.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 1555.
55.
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
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C. Considering Race in Insurance Pricing and
Tort Law Is Inefficient
1. Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for State Law Restrictions
on Racial Discrimination in Insurance Pricing
Although the accuracy of insurance pricing plays a pivotal role
in determining whether liability insurance achieves the objectives
of tort law, considerations of fairness limit the extent to which insurance providers should be allowed to discriminate in valuing
58
premiums. Race is an unfair and inefficient basis for discrimination when calculating individual insurance premiums.
Fairness arguments in defense of prohibiting the consideration
of race in insurance underwriting view insurance as a risk59
spreading mechanism. Discrimination in insurance underwriting
divides the general community of insureds into smaller risk pools,
60
which limits the degree of risk-spreading possible. Further, characteristics that influence risk assessments often depend on and
emphasize “preexisting social inequities” that reflect socially61
constructed biases and norms. For example, residents of racial
and ethnic urban neighborhoods are denied property insurance
through the process of “redlining.” Redlining is when insurance
providers determine certain areas are economically instable due to
the demographic characteristics of their residents, and therefore,
ineligible for insurance coverage due to the high risk they im62
pose. A similar structure is seen in automobile insurance rates,
63
which are also set based on where the insured lives. Under this
risk calculation, insurance providers deem inner cities as high-risk
which leads young, minority males to be charged high insurance
64
rates. If liability insurance providers consider race in calculating
premiums because race factors into the damages to be paid, the

58.
59.
60.
61.

Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY, 197, 206–10 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds.,
1991); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 534–36
(1983) (“However much the [insurance] companies plead happenstance, insurance ‘risk’
classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social stratification that is
familiar to everyone.”).
62.
Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, Prohibiting De Facto Redlining: Will Hurricane Katrina Draw a Discriminatory Redline in the Gulf Coast Sands Prohibiting Access to Home Ownership?, 14
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. AND SOC. JUST. 199 (2008); see also Austin, supra note 61, at 524.
63.
Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L.
REV. 403, 420 (1985).
64.
Id.
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fundamental mechanisms of insurance, like risk spreading, could
become ineffective. Further, the practice could perpetuate the effects of past discrimination and inequality.
Efficiency arguments also provide justifications for why legislatures should outlaw racial classifications in insurance underwriting.
For example, one common argument in defense of risk classifica65
tion is the potential for moral hazard. In contrast, moral hazard is
not an issue in the context of race because individuals cannot
66
change their race in response to insurance coverage. For example, health insurance may cause an individual to behave in a riskier
way, such as by exercising less or participating in more dangerous
activities because the individual does not bear the full costs of such
activities. Insurance providers often consider this information
67
when calculating health insurance rates. Insurance providers can
either encourage an individual to take more preventative health
measures to lower his or her rates, or the individual can compensate the insurance provider for the excess risk the individual poses
68
after being insured. This does not work in the context of race, as
any increase in an individual’s insurance premium due to race will
not influence the individual to engage in less risky behavior. Since
the insured is not in control of his or her race and cannot change
that characteristic, he or she will engage in the same behavior, regardless of risk level, insured or not.
Similarly, some could worry that tort damage awards that do not
69
consider race “overcompensate” tort victims. Essentially, the tort
damage award functions as a form of insurance coverage, and if it
overcompensates tort victims, they would take on more risk because they will be awarded more later. But, because an individual’s
race is not a behavior he or she can change in response to tort or
insurance compensation, “overcompensation” in the racial context
cannot lead to a moral hazard problem. The current regime, however, could create a moral hazard problem. Corporations are not
forced to consider the true costs of their tortious behavior because
they pay disproportionally low premiums when operating in minority communities, which do not capture the magnitude of harm to
society.
65.
See supra note 14–17 and accompanying text.
66.
Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 208.
67.
See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 84–85
(2013).
68.
See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 206–07.
69.
The current system of tort damages relies upon the idea that the cost of harm to an
individual is in part determined by the amount of income they will lose as a result of the injury. Since minority populations tend to have lower incomes and reduced work-life and lifeexpectancy on average, proponents of the traditional system might worry that by ignoring
these discrepancies, tort law is overcompensating minority plaintiffs.
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Twelve states completely prohibit the use of race in life, health,
70
disability, automobile, and property/casualty insurance. No federal statute completely bans insurance providers from considering
71
race when determining individual premiums, but language in the
72
73
Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 suggests that insurers
could be prohibited from using race in calculating individual insurance premiums. Further, reputational concerns and social
norms may prevent insurance providers from inquiring and classi74
fying risk based on race. State legislatures may have relied upon
the pressure of these social norms instead of enacting laws that
would completely prohibit racial classification in all lines of insur75
ance. Legislatures may assume that the insurance industry has
eradicated the practice due to stigmas around inquiring or out76
wardly discriminating based on race, though there is no evidence
that the industry has self-regulated in this way.
2. Scholarly Arguments for Prohibiting
Racial Considerations in Tort Law
Racial considerations are also used in tort law at the damages
77
stage to determine future wages and life expectancy of the victim.
78
Race-based actuarial tables become especially relevant with child
70.
Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 240.
71.
Id. at 199.
72.
See id. (explaining how new HUD regulations interpret language in the Fair Housing Act to prohibit racial discrimination in homeowners’ insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2000).
73.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the formation of contracts, but
no court has applied this standard to insurance premiums. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); see also
Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 594 (2005) (noting that 42 U.S.C. §
1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination, and differences in premiums between
individuals of different races reflects differences in risk, not intentional discrimination).
74.
See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 243 (referring to the taboo nature of inquiring or discussing an individual’s race in business transactions).
75.
Id. (explaining that state legislatures may assume that insurance providers have
stopped using race because if it were known that a certain provider discriminates based on
race, the providers would suffer reputational harm).
76.
Id.
77.
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 662, 670–78 (explaining how courts use race
and gender-based actuarial tables in their damages calculations, including a quote from a
forensic economist, who stated “if the injured child were born to a mixed couple but looks
black, like Barack Obama, I would use black tables [in the calculation of damages I present
to the jury]. However, if he is educated, and his life style is similar to the average typical
white, then I would be inclined to use white tables. It is all a matter of common sense.”).
78.
U.S. courts routinely use actuarial tables delineated on race and gender lines, often
presented by expert witnesses, to determine tort damages. Id. at 670. The three most common tables used are life expectancy tables, work-life expectancy tables, and average national
wage. Id. U.S. federal government life expectancy tables present statistics for white, black,
Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic black categories. Id. at 671. U.S. Depart-
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plaintiffs who have few other ways to prove those two factors other
79
than predictive tables. Race and gender stratifications in these tables create notable differences in damage awards for plaintiffs suf80
fering similar injuries. Only three jurisdictions–North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia–have codified the use of race-neutral
81
life expectancy tables, and few courts have prohibited parties
82
from introducing evidence from race-based actuarial tables. In response to this phenomenon, legal commentators have argued for
the prohibition of race-based actuarial tables in damages calculations on Equal Protection, economic efficiency, and distributive
83
justice grounds.
The constitutional argument against using race-based actuarial
tables in damage awards invokes the Equal Protection clause and
the strict scrutiny analysis that often accompanies state-sanctioned
84
racial discrimination. The main concern of this line of scholarship is whether judicial reliance on race-based actuarial tables is
considered state action under the Equal Protection Clause, as private parties introduce race-based actuarial tables via expert testi85
mony. Once courts establish that the use of race-based actuarial
tables is subject to strict scrutiny, they would likely find no compelling reason to uphold the use of race-based tables and find that
86
blended tables are a better alternative. Blended tables are actuarial tables that do not delineate on racial lines. The statistics are cal-

ment of Labor work-life expectancy tables provide statistics for white, black, and other racial
categories. Id. at 674. Courts integrate work-life expectancy with a plaintiff’s “established
earnings record” to determine future lost wages, but in cases of child plaintiffs who do not
have an “established earnings record,” courts use national average wage tables provided by
the Department of Labor. Id. at 675. These tables provide data by gender, educational level,
and occupation, and can be adjusted based on predictions for individual plaintiffs, which
include personal characteristics and family background. Id. at 676.
79.
See id. at 688; see also Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1440–41 (2005).
80.
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 675 (“According to the most recent [Bureau of
Labor Statistics] statistics, a white boy and a black girl with the same projected educational
levels who were injured identically at age sixteen would receive monumentally different
damage awards. Assuming each earned an average annual income of $25,000, the white
male would receive $302,500 more in future loss of earning capacity than the black woman.”) (footnote omitted).
81.
Id. at 680.
82.
Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 325, 328
(2018); see, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the use of race-based actuarial tables violated Equal Protection and Due Process and
“blended” tables should be used instead).
83.
See generally sources cited supra note 4.
84.
See generally Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82 (analyzing the Equal Protection implications of race-based actuarial tables in tort law).
85.
Compare id. at 348–59 with Anderson, supra note 4, at 251.
86.
See Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82, at 359–70 for a detailed analysis of how racebased tables would fare under a strict scrutiny analysis.
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culated using the whole population size, not a particular racial
group within the population as a whole.
Legal commentators have also examined the justifications for
race-based actuarial tables and determined these tables create distorted incentives for tortfeasors. Race-based actuarial tables lead to
lower damages for minority plaintiffs than non-minority plaintiffs
because of minority plaintiffs’ reduced expected future wages and
work life expectancy, which makes it less expensive to commit a
87
tort against a minority plaintiff than a non-minority plaintiff. This
distinction in tort damages creates an incentive to target certain
88
individuals and communities based on race. Beyond theoretical
arguments, research shows numerous examples of corporations
targeting minority individuals and communities, which aligns with
89
the incentives created by tort law.
One example of such targeting is the case of lead-based paint.
Lead poisoning from lead-based paints is extremely harmful to
90
young children and can result in developmental issues. In G.M.M.
ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, the court found the defendant
landlord had “perverse incentives” that discouraged the removal of
lead-based paint due to the race of the tort victims, who were pre91
dominantly black and Latino. Essentially, the landlord was not
motivated to remove the lead-based paint since the damages the
landlord would have to pay were cheaper because of the race of his
tenants. The court here also rejected the use of race-based statistics
because of their “unreliability,” citing the analysis used in McMillan
92
v. City of New York.
The targeting behavior exemplified by the case above is one of
the most problematic consequences of courts calculating damages
using race-based tables. Recent scholarship has fought back against
93
the traditional notion that targeting is efficient. Instead, it has become clearer that from a law and economics viewpoint, blended

87.
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 697–98.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 686–92 (citing examples of targeting of minority communities due to lower
damage awards, including a leaked 1991 World Bank memo which states, “Just between me
and you, shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging MORE migration of the dirty industries
to the [less developed countries]?”).
90.
Id. at 687–88; see also Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for California and Other States, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 390–91 (1997).
91.
G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 143 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (“[B]ecause it is cheaper to injure poor minority children, there is less incentive for
defendants to take measures to clean up toxic hazards in the neighborhoods most affected
by lead paint.”) (quoting Chamallas, supra note 79, at 1441).
92.
Id. at 136–49.
93.
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4.
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tables are more accurate and, therefore, economically efficient.
These efficiency arguments are important when considering the
functions of insurance providers and developing policy that makes
it easier for insurance providers to fulfill their compensatory objectives.
II. INSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS PRESENT ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS
FOR OUTLAWING THE USE OF RACE-BASED ACTUARIAL TABLES IN
DAMAGE AWARDS
The interaction of tort law and insurance provides a fresh perspective on the implications of using race-based actuarial tables to
determine tort awards in the corporate context. Though legal
scholarship recognizes the inherent inequity and inefficiency of us95
ing race in this context, the fact that insurance companies are the
ultimate cost bearers of tortious corporate conduct merits an analysis of why racial discrimination in tort damages is harmful when
considering the third-party role of an insurance provider. As tort
damages tend to be lower for minority plaintiffs because they belong
to racial minorities, insurance providers likely adjust corporate liability insurance costs for the race of potential tort victims. This Part
first shows it is inefficient and unfair for insurance providers to
consider race when pricing corporate liability insurance just as it is
when discriminating based on race in insurance underwriting for
individual insureds. The focus then shifts to the role of insurance
providers as corporate regulators and establishes how racial distortion of tort damages impairs the regulatory and deterrence effects
of the insurance relationship and could lead to negligent and
harmful behavior toward minority communities.
A. Effects of Tort Damages on Insurance Premiums
Insurance liability premiums reflect both the risk and overall
cost of the insured’s potential liability, and therefore, adjust to legal rules that affect tort damage awards. Insurance premiums are
calculated based on the expected losses of an insured, defined by
the magnitude of the harm multiplied by the probability the harm
94.
For a full analysis of the incentive structure that race-based tables provide and how
blended tables are economically more efficient than race-based tables, see Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 4.
95.
See, e.g., Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4; Jennifer H. Arlen, An Economic Analysis of
Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113 (1985) (arguing that future earnings
projections as a basis for calculating damages is economically inefficient).
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96

will occur. Insurance premiums especially react to changes in tort
law that establish more concrete rules for determining either liability or damages, as insurance providers are able to more accurately
assess and incorporate their predictions into the underwriting pro97
cess. Advocates for a uniform price on pain and suffering damages, for example, argue that the uncertainty that unregulated pain
and suffering damage awards cause can affect insurance premiums
because insurance providers are unable to accurately underwrite
98
the risk. Uncertainty in risk, or “risk ambiguity,” results in additional costs associated with insurance coverage, which are added to
99
the insured’s expected loss valuation. Legal uncertainty ultimately
correlates with higher liability insurance premiums or insurance
100
providers refusing to participate in certain coverage markets.
The products liability insurance market is illustrative. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation recommended that the Products Liability Fairness Act be passed in
part due to the problem of increasing costs for products liability
101
litigation and insurance. One problem with the products liability
102
system was the inconsistency in legal standards. At the time Congress was debating passing the Act, legal rules varied by jurisdic-

96.
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-andSuffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1793–94 (1995).
97.
See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 787 (1995). It is important to recognize that there is a debate among legal and policy experts as to whether tort
reform actually results in lower premiums because there is more certainty in legal outcomes.
Tort reform measures, such as placing caps on damages, were initially justified by theoretical
arguments that they would lead to lower insurance costs, and therefore, solve the insurance
“crisis” that was occurring in the 1970s. See, e.g., Sam Batkins & Jacqueline Varas, Tort Reform’s
Impact
on
Health
Care
Costs,
American
Action
Forum
(2016),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/tort-reforms-impact-health-care-costs/.
Since the adoption of such reforms, however, empirical evidence has been inconclusive in
determining whether tort reform actually results in lower insurance costs. See, e.g., Ronen
Avraham, Leemore Dafny & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on EmployerSponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 28 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 657, 680 (2012) (“We find evidence that the four most commonly implemented reforms (in recent years) are associated
with decreases in self-insured premiums of 1-2 percentage points each . . . By contrast, there
is little evidence that tort reform affects fully insured premiums.”); Kathryn Zeiler & Lorian
E. Hardcastle, Do Damages Caps Reduce Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums?: A Systematic
Review of Estimates and the Methods Used to Produce Them, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2012) (finding that “better data and more methodologically sound analysis” is needed to determine the impact of damages caps on insurance premiums). For the purposes of this article, it is not important whether tort reform
reduces insurance premiums, only that tort law and damages awards are considered when determining insurance premiums.
98.
Batkins & Varas, supra note 97.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
See SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION: REPORT, 1, 3
(1995), https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt/srpt69/CRPT-104srpt69.pdf.
102.
Id. at 5.
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103

tion. It was often difficult for products manufacturers and insurance providers to predict whether a jury would find that a specific
fact pattern met the legal standard. The uncertainty in which legal
standards would be used also affected settlements, as it was difficult
to “negotiate sensibly” without accurate information regarding po104
tential liability.
Though the empirical research does not analyze corporate liability insurance specifically, it is likely that corporations that interact more with members of racial minorities face lower insurance
premiums due to the reduced tort damages awarded to minority
105
tort plaintiffs. If tort law influences insurance premiums in the
pain and suffering and products liability contexts, reduced tort
damages for minority plaintiffs could have a similar effect. Because
minority plaintiffs present reduced liability costs, the expected value of a corporation’s liability is also reduced, which directly affects
106
its insurance premium. Further, liability insurance providers of107
ten use experience rating in determining an insured’s risk. If a
corporation has historically operated in areas with a higher minority population, its prior tort liability costs are likely to be lower than
they would be if the corporation operated in areas with a higher
108
white population. Therefore, without intentionally or consciously
discriminating on the basis of race, insurance underwriting still
may disadvantage minority populations. Insurance premiums become less expensive for corporations who harm minority plaintiffs
because tort damages awards are calculated in a racially biased way.
B. Race-Based Tables in Tort Damages Undermine the Social
Redistribution Functions of Insurance
Given the likelihood that corporations pay lower liability insurance premiums due to the race of their potential tort creditors,
fairness arguments against racial discrimination in insurance underwriting for individual plaintiffs must be considered in the con103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 5–6.
105.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
106.
See Croley & Hanson, supra note 96.
107.
See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
108.
No empirical data on the interaction between racial demographics of the area and
corporate insurance premiums has been generated, but a similar argument has been made
for low-income communities and liability insurance. See George L. Priest, Symposium: Issues in
Tort Reform: Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 502 (1987) (“The high correlation
of . . . damage elements with income, however, means that the premiums set equal to the
average damage payout will undercharge high income consumers and overcharge low income consumers. The provision of liability insurance tied to the sale of products and services requires the low income to subsidize the high income.”).
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109

text of tort damages. Scholars who argue for the elimination of
race as part of the underwriting process emphasize the risk110
spreading function of insurance. Risk spreading promotes “social
solidarity” within a particular group of insureds and results in in111
sured’s “cross-subsidiz[ing] each other’s risk.” Social solidarity
falls in line with the broader goals of insurance, such as reducing
aggregate costs of injury and increasing access to certain services,
112
such as healthcare, for more individuals.
The desire to ensure fairness in damage awards underpins two
arguments against using race-based tables. First, by eliminating
race-based damage awards and providing a framework where insurance providers can adopt race-blind liability premiums, communities of color would bear less of the risk of corporate tortious
conduct than they do now. In the same way individual insurance
coverage can promote social solidarity, eliminating race-based discrepancies in corporate insurance premiums would help spread
the costs of corporate tortious conduct among communities because corporations would no longer be encouraged to concentrate
harmful activity in communities of color. Second, insurance providers are often the entities that fulfill the compensatory justice
purpose of tort law when a corporation commits a tortious harm.
Just as scholars argue that, when insuring individuals, race should
not be a factor because it forces the insured to bear the cost of being a certain race, insurance companies should have to compensate minority tort victims at the same rate as white tort victims for
the same injuries. Race-based actuarial tables create a system where
insurance providers, as the cost bearers of corporate torts, force
minority tort victims to carry the additional costs of being a certain
race. Though not their direct insureds, in the context of corporate
insurance, tort victims are the ones insurance providers compensate. The legal system should not create different standards as to
whether insurance companies can employ racialized treatment
when compensating direct insureds versus the tort victims of their
corporate insureds.
109.
One could plausibly assume that the distortion of incentives that race-based actuarial tables cause could lead to a vicious cycle where corporations target minority communities
because it is cheaper to harm those communities than it is to harm predominately white
ones. This is difficult to argue, however, because of the numerous factors that go into corporate decision-making and the lack of empirical data in the area. Rather than attempt to argue that corporate behavior as a whole is determined by these distorted incentives, this Note
focuses on how these incentives impact insurance providers and hinder their attempts to
police corporations.
110.
See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 203. See
also Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 CONN.
INS. L.J. 199, 200–01 (2007).
111.
See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 203.
112.
See Mariner, supra note 110.
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C. Race-Based Tables Create a Differential Inaccuracy Problem for
Insurance Providers
Discriminatory tort damage awards result in inaccurate risk calculations in insurance premiums because race-based tables rely on
generalized inaccuracies. Scholars that argue against insurance
113
discrimination refer to this issue as “differential inaccuracy.” Differential inaccuracy occurs when the burden of inaccurate discrimination in insurance premiums disproportionately falls on certain
114
groups. One example of differential inaccuracy is when health
115
insurance providers charge higher rates to women than men. An
insured’s sex is a less costly measure of certain behavior than actually studying the behavior of each insured person, so insurance
providers use sex to estimate future risk no matter how accurately
116
an insured’s sex actually measures future risk. Scholars who argue for fairness in insurance pricing practices argue that the cost
of inaccurate risk classification should fall on all insureds, not just
117
those insureds inaccuracy directly impacts.
The inaccuracies in race-based actuarial tables also create a differential inaccuracy problem as insurance providers use discriminatory awards to determine corporate liability insurance premiums. Ronen Avraham and Kimberly Yuracko have identified three
main reasons why race-based actuarial tables are less accurate than
118
blended tables. One reason for the inaccuracy in race-based tables is these tables “capture only a snapshot in time” and fail to account for increased efforts in fighting racial discrimination and
119
changing views on race in general. Essentially, race-based tables
assume historical trends within a certain racial group will continue
in the future, which inaccurately reflects statistical trends. In fact,
life expectancy, workforce participation, and academic achieve120
ment among racial groups has converged. The second potential
source of inaccuracy in race-based actuarial tables is the high
standard errors associated with life expectancy, work-life expectan121
cy, and wages. High standard errors indicate high variation in the

113.
See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 217–18;
Abraham, supra note 63, at 431 (“[I]naccuracy is not objectionable if it works to everyone’s
benefit. Differential burdening of individual insureds, however, may be objectionable.”).
114.
See Abraham, supra note 63, at 431.
115.
Id.
116.
See id.
117.
See id.
118.
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 700–06.
119.
Id. at 701.
120.
Id. at 701–03 (providing a detailed look at the evidence of the convergence of life
expectancy, workforce participation, and academic achievement between racial groups).
121.
Id. at 704–05
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population, which demonstrates how using a particular statistic
122
could be highly inaccurate for a particular individual. Finally, Avraham and Yuracko discuss the skewness of each racial group’s distribution, which demonstrates that the medians and modes for
123
each group are similar, though their means are different. The
similarity in medians and modes presents a case for why each racial
124
group should be treated the same when awarded damages.
Race-based tables produce inaccurate calculations of tort damages, which disproportionately impact minority communities.
Since differences in race do not correctly predict an individual’s
125
future earnings or expected work life, among other statistics used
in calculating awards, insurance providers inaccurately calculate
the premiums that corporations should pay. For example, if a corporation’s past tort liability primarily involved black plaintiffs, then
the total cost of its tort liability would, on average, be less than if a
126
corporation was liable to primarily white plaintiffs. This creates a
differential inaccuracy problem as minority communities bear the
costs of this particular inaccuracy in the expected loss calculation
127
due to lower insurance compensation and potentially distorted
128
incentives of insured tortfeasors that insurance policies perpetu129
ate. Though there is no way to completely predict future risk, the
particular flaw in calculating insurance premiums based on discriminatory tort damages disproportionately burdens minority
communities.
Inaccuracy in this context does not refer to the actual monetary
calculation of insurance premiums given the current state of law.
Neither insurance providers nor insureds are losing profit as they
are likely assessing the expected value of an insured’s liability
based on the actual discriminatory damages courts are awarding
130
plaintiffs. Rather, insurance premiums are inaccurate in the
sense that the tort damage award calculations they rely upon do
122.
See id. The authors stipulate that, though they predict that variance would be reduced in blended tables due to the larger number of observations, “mathematically, however, this outcome is not guaranteed.” Id. at 705. To be sure that blended tables would offer
more accurate results, the standard deviations of blended tables should be calculated. Id.
123.
See id. at 705.
124.
Id. at 706.
125.
See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
126.
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 675 (explaining the difference in damage
awards a white boy and black girl with the same projected educational levels would receive
under the current process by which courts calculate tort damages).
127.
See id.
128.
See id. at 686–92 (discussing lead-based paint, healthcare, and pollution as three
real-life examples of discriminatory tort damage awards creating distorted incentives for
tortfeasors to target minority communities or plaintiffs).
129.
See supra notes 38–57 and accompanying text (discussing how insurance providers
can monitor, influence, and control insured behavior).
130.
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 670–77.
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131

not value minority individuals in a fair or precise way, and therefore serve to overburden minority plaintiffs with the costs of tortious conduct. Inaccurate premiums allow corporations to evade
the true burden of the losses they cause. Further, minority plaintiffs are less likely to bring lawsuits due to factors such as excessive
132
litigation costs and distrust of the legal system. The reduced likelihood of facing liability also reduces the overall costs imposed on
corporations for tortious conduct and contributes to differential
inaccuracy.
D. Inaccuracy in Premium Calculations
Impedes Deterrence Functions of Insurance
The potential inaccuracy and undervaluation of harm to minority actors distorts and underutilizes the deterrence mechanisms insurance providers can employ. The deterrence argument for prohibiting race-based actuarial tables in this context is stronger when
133
considering the role of insurance providers. Insurance providers
often monitor and deter harmful conduct of their insureds due to
their financial incentives in minimizing risk and the tools they have
134
in place to enforce compliance with risk-reducing methods. The
deterrence aspect of the insurance relationship certainly depends
in part on the ability of insurance providers to determine risk and
135
accurately price premiums. Accurate risk assessment and pricing
are important for two reasons: deterrence through premiums and
other risk-reducing methods.
The insurance premium is a direct and semi-responsive cost on
the corporation, and fluctuations in this price is one factor that
can influence whether insurance over-deters or under-deters cer-

131.
See id. at 700–06.
132.
See David McElhattan, Laura Beth Nielsen, & Jill D. Weinberg, Race and Determinations of Discrimination: Vigilance, Cynicism, Skepticism, and Attitudes About Legal Mobilization in
Employment Civil Rights, 51 LAW & SOC. REV. 669, 674–78 (2017) (discussing legal cynicism of
minority individuals due to their “lived experiences,” including instances where legal authorities have treated them unfairly or have dismissed their concerns, which leads to reluctance to turn to legal remedies though they have suffered injustice).
133.
Avraham and Yuracko address deterrence objectives when discussing the “perverse
ex-ante incentives” created by race-based actuarial tables and how blended tables achieve
“optimal deterrence model” of using tort law to induce companies to engage in behavior
that minimizes the costs of precautions and the costs of harm from accidents not prevented.” See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 686–92, 697. In general, the deterrence effect
of tort law has been contested. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In contrast, this
Section shows that insurance providers have better mechanisms in place to deter tortious
corporate conduct, which provides further reasons for courts to use blended tables.
134.
See discussion supra Section I.B.
135.
See Fischer & Jerry, supra note 5, at 864–66.
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136

tain conduct. In fact, insurance premiums likely serve as better
deterrents for tortious conduct than damage awards because premiums are usually the product of a contractual relationship between two sophisticated parties, while tort litigation between cor137
porate actors and regular citizens is not. The current state of tort
law does not provide the necessary financial incentives for insurance providers to price premiums in a way that forces corporations
to internalize the true cost of tortious conduct against minority
communities. As established in Section C, the current inaccuracy
of insurance premiums is due to their lack of consideration for the
externalities of tortious corporate conduct.
When considering the other methods insurance providers employ to reduce risk, such as requiring certain safety standards or in138
spections, accurate risk assessment is also necessary. If an insurance provider does not detect or under-appreciates a risk, it will
likely not implement the appropriate policies and deterrence
mechanisms. This is especially true when the insured causes a
harm that is externalized to non-insured actors, as neither the insured nor the insurance provider has the financial incentive to re139
duce the risk of harm. If the law were to provide a more equalized measure of tort damages regardless of race, insurance
providers would be more likely to require corporations to implement the same precautionary measures regardless of who past and
potential tort victims are. For example, in the case of lead paint
poisoning, an insurance provider may not enforce or monitor
building inspections because “it is cheaper to harm minority children” and resources could be allocated to preventing more costly
140
injuries. The current legal regime produces incentives for this
scenario to occur. On the other hand, if the law were to enforce
more equal damages against corporate tortfeasors, insurance providers would be more likely to require building inspections and repairs because the associated risks would be similar despite the race
of the tenants.

136.
See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 337 (“Given these standard explanations of liabilityrule deterrence, it is easy to see that perfectly responsive insurance poses no problem. Covered by such insurance, a party who engages in a certain activity and who declines to adopt
the safety precaution will encounter a high premium. Since he can reduce this premium by
$1000 by purchasing a $700 safety precaution, he has a full incentive to make that purchase;
tort law’s deterrence objectives are hence preserved.”).
137.
Deterrence objectives are better achieved when a party is certain it will face penalties for its conduct. Insurance premiums that are enforced by contractual provisions are a
more certain cost to a party than the possibility of being found liable for a tort violation and
having to pay damages that could vary greatly.
138.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
139.
See Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1543, 1595–96.
140.
See G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 143.
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III. STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD OUTLAW THE USE OF RACE-BASED
TABLES AND MANDATE BLENDED TABLES AS THE
MINIMUM MEASURE OF TORT DAMAGES
In response to the issues race-based damage calculations cause
regarding insurance pricing and policing, states should pass legislation that outlaws the use of race-based tables in calculating tort
damages. As tort law aims to reduce overall harm with adequate
141
deterrence, and risk-spreading is an important function of insur142
ance, the law should facilitate awarding the appropriate level of
damages to minority plaintiffs. To achieve this, state legislatures
should mandate that the minimum amount of damages awarded
143
be calculated using blended tables. Courts would still be allowed
to adjust upward based on special circumstances, such as education
level of a particular plaintiff or previous earned wages, but the
minimum amount should depend on blended tables that do not
discriminate based on race.
This Part discusses the comparative merits of state legislative action as opposed to judicial solutions and, in particular, addresses a
few perennial arguments scholars confront when arguing that racebased tables should be replaced with a non-discriminatory method
of damages calculation. A reform that focuses on state legislative
action is not subject to the whim of the courts and does not rely on
constitutional doctrine and precedent for the reform to be enacted. Further, state legislatures have traditionally been the primary
actors for insurance and damages regulation, so state action would
present few federalism concerns and allow the party most
equipped to enforce the reform to enact it. Also, the use of blended tables as a minimum for damage awards not only reduces targeting but would also introduce consistency in insurance underwriting. A reliable minimum for tort damages removes uncertainty
from insurance underwriting, which improves differential inaccuracy and reduces underwriting costs for insurance providers. By
changing current practices and prohibiting the use of race-based
actuarial tables in damages calculations, insurance providers would
impose a more accurate measure of the costs of corporate tortious
conduct on their corporate insureds. Insurance providers could also use their more efficient and effective deterrence methods to
141.
See, e.g., Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 697.
142.
Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance, supra note 3, at 198.
143.
Scholars have proposed other reforms as alternatives to race-based tables, such as
using the national average wage for all plaintiffs whose wage and work-life computations
would be speculative in some way. Those reforms, however, face greater challenges in justifying the distributive nature of that sort of damages scheme as opposed to accurately calculating the individual harm a tort victim suffers.
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produce the optimal level of harm for all communities. Finally,
this reform focuses on corporate tortfeasors, rather than individual
human actors, which limits overdeterrence concerns and allows
more effectual policing of corporate behavior.
A. Statutory Regulation Avoids Issues Associated with
Equal Protection Doctrine
State legislative efforts to reform tort damages encounter fewer
legal barriers compared to reforms based in constitutional litigation. In particular, there is an open debate as to whether the use of
race-based tables constitutes state action under the Equal Protection Clause, which demonstrates the possibility that constitutional
litigation would not result in reform. One approach scholars who
argue against race-based tables use is analyzing the practice under
144
Equal Protection doctrine. One of the many requirements in
bringing a successful Equal Protection challenge is that the claim
145
must allege a state action, which could present a challenge for
plaintiffs in this context. The reason that the state action question
is not clear here is because judges and juries are not awarding lower damages due to their own racial biases, but rather relying on bi146
ased evidence. Based on constitutional precedent, if judges and juries were relying on their own racial biases, an award would likely
147
be struck down as unconstitutional. Race-based actuarial tables
are different, however, because parties via expert witnesses, rather
than judges and juries, introduce the racially-biased statistics used
148
in calculating awards. It is less clear that reliance on racially discriminatory evidence constitutes state action because judges and
juries are not the source of the bias–the parties are.
Yuracko and Avraham present various ways that using race-based
149
tables to calculate tort damages could constitute state action.
They rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in
144.
Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82; Jennifer B. Wriggins, Constitution Day Lecture:
Constitutional Law and Tort Law: Injury, Race, Gender, and Equal Protection, 63 ME. L. REV. 263
(2010).
145.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948)
146.
Cf. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (finding that evidence
that a juror relied on racial bias, animus, or stereotypes requires the “no-impeachment rule
give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement
and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991) (stating that a trial judge is state actor for 14th Amendment purposes).
147.
See id.
148.
Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82, at 349.
149.
Id. at 351–58.
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Shelley v. Kraemer, which struck down state enforcement of racially
150
restrictive private covenants. One interpretation of the Court’s
holding in Shelley is that state enforcement of private discrimination that significantly burdens social and economic participation is
151
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection clause. Yuracko and
Avraham use this interpretation of Shelley to support their argument that the use of race-based actuarial tables is state-enforced
152
discrimination. They also argue that using race-based tables in
calculating tort damages is “symbolic encouragement” or “facilitation” of discriminatory behavior, which are theories that also find
153
support in Shelley.
Other scholars, however, have critiqued the constitutional analysis of race-based tables because private parties introduce the discriminatory statistics through expert witnesses. Although courts enforce damage awards, they are not bound by expert witness
154
calculations of damages when deciding the amount. Both judges
and juries are allowed to give as much weight as they want to ex155
pert testimony regarding what the damage amount should be.
Aside from any statutory cap on damages, courts can award a wide
range of damage amounts that differ from what the parties present
156
and are given deference by appellate courts. Therefore, no state
actor is required to incorporate the biased statistics that experts introduce in the final damages award, though evidence still shows
that damage awards tend to be biased against minority plaintiffs.
Further, under the state action test in Edmonson, race-based actuarial tables may not constitute state action. The Supreme Court
found that to determine whether a particular deprivation is the result of state action, the court should consider “first, whether the
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege having its source in state authority, and second,
whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be
157
described in all fairness as a state actor.” The second prong of
whether the private party could “in all fairness” be described as a
150.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14.
151.
Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82, at 352–53; see also Shelley, 334 U.S. at 10.
152.
Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82, at 352–55.
153.
Id. at 355–58.
154.
Anderson, supra note 4, at 237 (“Expert testimony, on the other hand, merely sets
forth one piece of evidence from which the jury—the ‘quintessential governmental body’—
may consider.”) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991)).
See Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Notes (recognizing that an expert explains relevant scientific or other principles, which the trier of fact then applies to the facts of the
case).
155.
See generally Fed. R. Evid. 702.
156.
Monetary damages awarded by a judge or a jury are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.
157.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
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state actor calls for the evaluation of certain factors, such as whether the private actor relies on government assistance or benefits,
performs a traditional government function, or causes an injury
that “is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmen158
tal authority.”
Scholars disagree over the extent to which race-based actuarial
tables meet the Edmonson factors. For example, Chamallas argues
that the introduction of race-based actuarial tables as the basis for
damage awards requires government assistance because the judge
159
actively admits that testimony into evidence. By admitting testimony with underlying bias, the judge is essentially sanctioning the
160
use of race as “legally permissible criterion.” Anderson, on the
other hand, contends that Chamallas ignores the Edmonson court’s
focus on a court’s procedural control over the jury selection pro161
162
cess, which was the state action in question in Edmonson. Anderson distinguishes race-based tables from discriminatory preemptive
strikes because the court does not have the same level of control
over the extent and the basis of expert testimony as it does over the
163
jury selection process.
This Note does not purport to argue that the use of race-based
tables in tort damage calculations is or is not state action under the
Equal Protection clause. Rather, the debate about whether state action exists in this context highlights the issue with proposing a reform based in constitutional doctrine over statutory reform. In addition to concerns about state action, there are other factors to
consider when using the court for reform. These include finding
the “right” plaintiff, navigating the effects of stare decisis, and finding an appropriate enforcement mechanism for judicial decisions.
These factors could all influence the court’s judgment and whether a court would hold race-based tables unconstitutional. Though
state statutory reform would likely face certain political barriers,
access to the political system via voting and lobbying seems at least
as accessible as, if not more than, reform through constitutional
litigation.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 621.
See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 108–09.
Id. at 108.
See Anderson, supra note 4.
See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 614.
See Anderson, supra note 4, at 236.
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B. States Have Historically Been the Primary Regulators of
Tort and Insurance Law
State legislatures are the primary actors in insurance law and
damages regulation and are therefore in the best position to intervene. In response to a Supreme Court decision holding that insur164
ance regulations fall under Commerce Clause powers, Congress
passed the McCarren-Ferguson Act, which ensures that insurance
165
regulation will be left to the states. Some goals of state insurance
regulation include fair pricing and preventing unfair practices by
166
insurance companies. While the reform proposed here is not one
that regulates insurance directly, states have already developed
statutory precedent and institutional knowledge regarding insurance regulation. Therefore, when justifying tort damage reform
with the improvements it can cause in insurance policing and pricing accuracy, state legislatures would have the motivation and expertise in insurance regulation to make the proposed changes.
One issue with insurance regulation at the state level is the potential for a competitive regulatory scheme, where states are reluctant to enact reforms that affect insurance premiums because they
want to encourage insurance coverage of businesses in their states.
The worry is that by relying on individual state regulation, insurance regulation will become a race to the bottom. Scholars agree
that a “race to the bottom” market in insurance regulation is not
167
beneficial, especially to consumers. Upon closer examination, it
seems unlikely that this particular reform would catalyze such a reaction from the market. Though insurance regulation is left to the
individual states, the National Association of Insurance Commis168
sioners (NAIC) helps facilitate a national regulatory system. The
efforts of NAIC to standardize insurance regulation, as well as the
nationalization of the insurance industry in response to the nationalization of many other industries, already serve as appropriate
169
protections against inefficient deregulation. There seems to be
no reason that these mechanisms would stop functioning in light
of states adopting the reform proposed by this Note. Because state
legislatures already regulate to promote fairness in insurance avail170
ability and pricing, this reform would not be so radical as to gen164.
U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
165.
See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625, 633–34 (1999).
166.
Id. at 629.
167.
See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation? Against
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707 (2010).
168.
See Randall, supra note 165, at 635.
169.
Id. at 634–40.
170.
Id. at 629.
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erate concerns that insurance providers would leave certain states
upon enactment.
In addition to insurance regulation, states have also been the
source of tort regulation. Though some scholars have noted that
federal actors have become more active in interfering with state
171
regulation of tort law, tort law remains an area of “traditional
172
state concern.” States have enacted tort reform in a variety of
ways, including placing caps on pain and suffering damages, placing caps on punitive damages, and exempting certain industries
173
from liability for certain claims. Many state statutory tort reforms
174
have worked to limit defendant liability. This trend is partially
due to the efforts of American Tort Reform Association (ATRA),
175
an interest group that seeks to quell abuses of the tort system.
Though the reform presented in this Note would not fit the trend
of limiting tort liability, the benefits it would provide in promoting
the fairness and deterrence goals of insurance and tort law may
justify a reform which increases damages liability. Many state legislative changes to tort law were made in response to the liability in176
surance crisis in the 1980s. A reform that could potentially stabilize insurance premiums and introduce more certainty into the
underwriting process would protect states from enduring another
insurance crisis. These benefits may outweigh the influence of corporate interest groups in state legislatures and allow a reform to be
passed, though enactment can never be guaranteed.
C. Blended Tables Reduce Targeting and
Introduce Certainty in Damage Awards
Scholars recognize that blended tables are a better alternative to
the racially discriminatory tables that courts currently use in calcu177
lating tort damages. Specifically, blended tables would reduce
the incentive to target minority communities because the damages
owed to those communities are less than those owed to predominately white communities. By taking race out of premium calculations, corporations are less likely to take race into account when
making decisions, such as where to locate manufacturing plants or

171.
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2009).
172.
Id. at 1504; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 554 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
173.
Klass, supra note 172, at 1513–18.
174.
See id. at 1513.
175.
See id. at 1516.
176.
See id. at 1513.
177.
See, e.g., Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4.
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where to extract resources. Just as important, as explained in Part
II, insurance providers would also no longer take race into account
when pricing corporate premiums and creating corporate compliance and policing measures. While there is no evidence that insurance providers actively consider the race of potential tort victims of
an insured corporation, they may consider race indirectly because
of the discrepancy in damage awards the corporation has had to or
will have to pay. Blended tables remove race from consideration in
damage awards because they do not categorize the relevant statistics based on race. This policy would eventually reduce the racial
discrepancy in damage awards, which would in turn reduce the variation in insurance premiums. No matter the race of past or potential tort victims, corporations will be held liable to a less varying
amount and insurance providers will create compliance practices
that cater to these costs.
There is some precedent for state legislatures to amend the type
of actuarial table a court should use in calculating damages. Three
states, which include North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia,
178
do not rely upon Department of Labor tables. Instead, they have
179
adopted their own tables which do not stratify by race. Eleven
states also have jury instructions that preference certain life expec180
tancy tables, and six of those states have race-neutral jury instruc181
tion provisions. There have been no documented attempts to
strike down race-based actuarial tables based on inefficiency or
fairness concerns, though.
Courts should be able to upwardly adjust awards that are calculated from blended tables, however, to mitigate the harm blended
tables can cause for “above average” plaintiffs. By incorporating the
statistics of all classes of people, blended tables provide statistics
that represent the mean population. For those who currently benefit from the more favorable statistics for certain demographics,
such as white males, or through some other factor, such as educa178.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-46; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-150; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01419.
179.
Id.
180.
These states include Alaska, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 680. See also AL. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INST. 20.13; 3932: Life Expectancy,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 773 (2012); PATTERN INST. KAN.
CIVIL 171.45; Life expectancy tables, KENTUCKY WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS § 13:3 (2012-13
ed.); MODEL CIVIL JURY INST.—MICHIGAN; 4A MINN. PRAC., JURY INST. GUIDES—CIVIL
APPENDIX (5th ed.); N.J. CT. R. 1:13-5, APP. I; N.Y. PATTERN JURY INST.—CIVIL APPENDIX A (3d
ed.); N.D. PATTERN JURY INST.—LIFE EXPECTANCY (PERSONAL INJURY); 8 TENN. PRAC.
PATTERN JURY INST. T.P.I.—CIVIL APPENDIX C (2012 ed.); 6 WASH. PRAC., WASH. PATTERN
JURY INST. CIV. WPI 34.04 (6th ed.).
181.
Alaska, California, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Washington expressed
preference for race-neutral tables or statistics. Id.
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tion, the blended damage calculation would undervalue the harm
caused to them. Scholars have noted that blended tables would not
182
only “depress awards for individual white victims,” but also that
black males may not necessarily benefit from a switch to blended
183
tables. While the inclusion of white male statistics in blended tables increases awards for black males, the inclusion of statistics relevant to female plaintiffs may depress the award more than the
184
current race-based table for black men. Courts should still not be
able to adjust upward for race regardless, as that would defeat the
entire purpose of the reform. By allowing some amount of upward
adjustment, however, the judicial process can adequately compensate “above average” plaintiffs, while plaintiffs who the system currently harms would not automatically be given lower awards because of race.
Although the upward adjustment of tort awards would likely result in less certainty in insurance predictions of tort damages
judgments, the net harm would still be less than the harm generated from race-conscious tables. Certainty of risk is important for insurance providers because it helps create more accurate insurance
185
premiums and reduces underwriting costs. The discrepancy in
awards due to race introduces more uncertainty and additional
costs into the underwriting process as insurance providers may
have to determine the demographics of future tort victims and account for varying costs. By requiring that race be removed from
damage calculations and that blended tables be the minimum for
damage awards, insurance providers would know what costs to use
in calculating an insured’s premium. Though this reform would
allow for some uncertainty in damage awards due to upward adjustments, blended tables would establish the minimum award no
matter the race of the tort victim. Therefore, insurance providers
have certainty as to the minimal costs that must be incorporated in
insurance premiums. Though not a complete mitigation of the
costs that uncertainty imposes, establishing a more certain minimum will help insurance providers better account for tort damage
costs in their premiums. Further, insurance providers would no
longer have less incentive to encourage compliance with safety
measures based on the racial compositions of the community with
which an insured corporation interacts. All tort victims regardless
of race will be valued at the same minimum award, so insurance
providers would require safety measures up to that minimum
182.
183.
184.
185.

Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 82, at 363.
Id. at 333 n.30.
Id. at 363.
See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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award. The certainty blended tables create will establish a minimum standard of safety, which would eliminate the disproportionate burden placed on minority tort victims.
CONCLUSION
Courts continue to award damages for corporate tortious conduct based on the race of the plaintiff with little judicial oversight
or deviation from the practice. The result of such damage calculations is the undervaluation of injuries for minority plaintiffs compared to white plaintiffs. The effects of racial disparities in tort
damages on insurance providers properly policing corporate behavior and accurately pricing corporate premiums to deter such
behavior add to the literature of why race-based damage awards
should be outlawed. State legislatures must replace the outdated
and inefficient practice of race-based tort damage calculations with
the use of blended tables. Blended tables take race out of the tort
damage calculation, which in turn takes race out of the calculations for assessing corporate insurance premiums and for determining the level of preventative measures an insurance company
will require the company to invest to prevent tortious incidents.
Both tort law and insurance law recognize the value in accurate
damage calculations and how these calculations further deterrence
and restitution objectives. But, to conflate the results of biased educational and employment structures with how much an individual
is worth only results in an unjust, burdensome system for plaintiffs.

